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Abstract: Conventional Data Leakage Prevention
(DLP) systems suffer from the following major draw-
back: Privacy policies that define what constitutes
data leakage cannot be seamlessly defined and enforced
across heterogeneous forms of communication. Admin-
istrators have the dual burden of: (1) manually self-
interpreting policies from handbooks to specify rules
(which is error-prone); (2) extracting relevant informa-
tion flows from heterogeneous communication protocols
and enforcing policies to determine which flows should
be admissible. To address these issues, we present the
Verifiable and ACtionable Contextual Integrity Norms
Engine (VACCINE), a framework for building adapt-
able and modular DLP systems. VACCINE relies on
(1) the theory of contextual integrity to provide an ab-
straction layer suitable for specifying reusable protocol-
agnostic leakage prevention rules and (2) programming
language techniques to check these rules against cor-
rectness properties and to enforce them faithfully within
a DLP system implementation. We applied VACCINE
to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and
Enron Corporation privacy regulations. We show that
by using contextual integrity in conjunction with ver-
ification techniques, we can effectively create reusable
privacy rules with specific correctness guarantees, and
check the integrity of information flows against these
rules. Our experiments in emulated enterprise settings
indicate that VACCINE improves over current DLP sys-
tem design approaches and can be deployed in enter-
prises involving tens of thousands of actors.
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1 Introduction
Enterprises rely on Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) sys-
tems to prevent accidental or unintentional flow of sensi-
tive information such as credit card and other business
data to unauthorized entities [1]. Most deployed DLP
products, such as [2–6], include a centralized adminis-
trative system that takes domain-specific rules written
by administrators as input to enforce the specific DLP
policy of the enterprise [1, 5, 6]. We argue that the de-
sign of this central component of state-of-the-art DLP
systems has several shortcomings and propose a new
framework to address these.
The first shortcoming concerns usability. On the one
hand, the process of applying policies “[does not] fit the
low technical expertise of many policy authors” [7]. On
the other hand, administrators of rule-based DLP sys-
tems have to manually implement the rules using pri-
vacy handbooks written by lawyers.
Existing DLP systems do not allow the rules to be
expressed at the right level of abstraction. In most sys-
tems, policies are reduced to a ruleset of regular expres-
sions, templates, keywords, or patterns [8], which con-
flates two aspects of DLP that should be addressed sep-
arately: 1) how to extract information flows from com-
munication traffic, and 2) how to enforce the leakage
prevention rules that determine which extracted flows
are admissible. For example, policy authors who spec-
ify DLP rules should not have to think about how to
extract a credit card number or other piece of sensi-
tive information from a particular source of communi-
cation, as this might require additional technical exper-
tise. Instead, they should be enabled to specify rules on
a more abstract level that only concerns the informa-
tion flows implicit in these communications. Moreover,
existing DLP systems do not provide support tools that
enable administrators to check the correctness or com-
pleteness of the specified rules. It is therefore not sur-
prising that the process of translating policy handbooks
to DLP rules is often error-prone [9] and relying on in-
complete default templates. Companies often rely on
third-party providers such as Nucleuz “to develop a cus-
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
02
74
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 N
ov
 20
17
The VACCINE Framework for Building DLP Systems 2
tom DLP policy to detect and protect [the] company’s
specific data and assets" [10].
Second, there is a need for “developing flexible pol-
icy frameworks that can deploy the same logical policy
to heterogenous devices or systems with incompatible ab-
stractions” [7]. However, conflating flow extraction and
leakage prevention is in direct conflict with this principle
and unduly limits the effectiveness and applicability of
existing DLP systems. Rules defined by, say, regular ex-
pressions target unstructured data and are therefore less
suited for structured forms of communication such as
web forms and directory service maps [11]. The leakage
prevention rules should abstract from the specific type
of communication from which information flows are ex-
tracted and apply to both structured and unstructured
data sources alike.
In response, this paper presents Verifiable and
ACtionable Contextual Integrity Norms Engine (VAC-
CINE), a new framework for building powerful and
modular DLP systems. VACCINE casts data leakage
prevention as a privacy problem expressed in the the-
ory of Contextual Integrity (CI) [12]. More precisely,
VACCINE uses CI to model the information flows in an
enterprise and the notion of data leakage, and to ex-
press privacy policies as actionable (mechanized) rules
for preventing these leakages using standard program-
ming language techniques. DLP systems that follow the
VACCINE framework do not have to assume any par-
ticular class of application domains or communication
exchange formats. The specification of DLP rules and
checking information flows for data leakages is done on
the abstract level defined in terms of a few simple con-
cepts of CI theory.
Our evaluation of the proposed framework examines
the question of how to effectively design an enterprise
DLP system using VACCINE given a handbook that
outlines the privacy and confidentiality policies. As a
case study, we evaluate VACCINE on the Family Ed-
ucational Rights and Privacy Act and Enron Corpora-
tion privacy regulations. We show that we can create
privacy rules with certain correctness guarantees and
effectively check for the integrity of information flows,
i.e., data leakages, against these regulations. Our exper-
iments indicate that VACCINE can effectively and effi-
ciently process privacy-sensitive information exchanges
between tens of thousands of actors in emulated enter-
prise settings.
2 Design
In this section we start by stating the threat model
assumptions and elaborate on the design goals behind
VACCINE. We then provide a brief overview of con-
textual integrity and discuss how it is implemented in
VACCINE framework.
2.1 Threat Model Assumptions
In our design of the VACCINE framework we make the
following main threat model assumptions faced by the
existing DLP systems:
1. Modern DLP solutions are maintained by system
admins or other IT personal who are in charge of
manually mapping the relevant governing policies
and regulation into a set of DLP rules.
2. DLP systems handle information exchanges across
heterogeneous systems with varied application log-
ics and therefore are subject to logical misinterpre-
tations due an oversight by the admin personal.
3. The enforced DLP policies can significantly deviate
from privacy expectations of the system end-user,
which can lead to unintentional breach.
4. DLP system is designed to prevent accidental infor-
mation leakage due to an unintentional breach of a
regulation or policy.
5. A typical end user is not engaged in a malicious
behavior to circumvent the existing DLP measures.
We now describe the key building blocks behind the
VACCINE framework.
2.2 Design goals
VACCINE treats information leakage prevention not as
a security measure (blocking access to sensitive con-
tent) but rather as a privacy logic verification prob-
lem (ensuring that information flows are consistent with
the prescribed policies). By using a well-known pri-
vacy framework as a specification of allowed informa-
tion flows which are then expressed in a separate form
of declarative logic, VACCINE decouples the processes
of defining and enforcing the policy rules. More specifi-
cally, VACCINE aims to achieve a) usability by allowing
non-technical personnel to devise privacy policies that
can be directly enforced by system administrators, b)
adaptability by defining DLP rules in a way that ab-
stracts from flow extraction and allowing one rule en-
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forcement engine to be combined with flow extractors
for different types of communications, and c) modular-
ity by separating the processes of capturing informa-
tion flows and enforcing DLP rules and, consequently,
enabling engineering and research efforts to focus on
enhancing each aspect in isolation. We now explain in
more details the manner in which VACCINE achieves
its design goals.
Usability VACCINE uses an intermediate abstraction
in the form of the CI privacy framework, explained
in Section 2.3, between the enforced DLP rules and
the logic prescribed by the privacy handbooks. Table 1
shows the mapping the original text of the policy into a
CI representation and eventually into VACCINE’s en-
forceable and verifiable rules, columns 1-3 respectively.
This removes the need for the system administra-
tors to self-interpret the original text of privacy policies
(column 1) into rules enforced by the modern DLP sys-
tems (column 4). Such a burdensome process can lead
to misinterpretations and inconsistent assumptions, as
we discovered in our own evaluation (Section 4.2).
With VACCINE the legal and Chief Privacy Offi-
cer (CPO) departments (we refer to them as a DLP
team throughout the paper) are able to check policies
before deploying them. The rules are expressed in terms
of the theory of contextual integrity which in turn has
known formulations in formal logics [13, 14] and as a
consequence, the devised rules can be checked for var-
ious correctness properties using formal methods. This
way, many bugs in the implementation of a specific DLP
policy can be caught before deployment. This allows the
administrator to map the devised policies into VAC-
CINE rules by just focusing on system and enterprise
information essential.
Adaptability The VACCINE rules abstract away from
low-level system details, they can be enforced in het-
erogenous environments. Hence, the same rules can be
integrated into existing applications running on differ-
ent devices and relying on different communication ex-
changes. For example, the policy in Table 1: Faculty
members (FM) do not have access to student academic
records (AR) unless they have a “legitimate educational
interest,” which in current DLP system requires sepa-
rate policies and different enforcement mechanisms for
different platforms, such as for email communication
and for cloud access (e.g., MS Exchange [6] and MS
Sharepoint/One Drive [15], respectively). The VAC-
CINE policy can be used across other communication
platforms. The administrators just need to specify one
set of rules that govern leakage prevention for all types
of enterprise communication (emails, tweets, web forms,
etc.)
Modularity The functionality for preventing data leak-
ages works on the abstract level defined in terms of con-
cepts of contextual integrity. We emphasize the modular
nature of this design. As shown in Figure 1, in VAC-
CINE, the CI flow checker, which is responsible for en-
suring the consistency of flows, is decoupled from the
rest of the application that provides conversion from
concrete communication exchanges to sequences of CI
flows. The checker, is parameterized by privacy rules
and is hosted on the server side, unaware of the applica-
tion layer innerworkings and communication exchange
formats.
Not only does that this allows for widespread inte-
gration into existing systems, it also provides the appli-
cation with additional informational obfuscation layer.
Using policies in Table 1 as an example; with VACCINE,
there is no need to reveal the actual personal obser-
vations or academic records, as required by traditional
DLP solutions (see the Condition clause in column 4), in
order to check if the information flow adheres to FERPA
policies. Sensitive information is obfuscated by the ap-
plication through the using CI language, which, as we
discuss in Section 2.3, only reveals the type of informa-
tion being conveyed not its actual value. The responsi-
bility of such applications is to implement functional-
ity that extracts information flows from communication
exchanges and passes the flows to the DLP component
enforcing the rules.
2.3 Contextual Integrity Overview
In our work, we adopt the theory of contextual integrity
(CI) as our underlying conception of privacy. The power
of CI comes from its simple, yet not trivial way of cap-
turing and subsequently reasoning about the governing
privacy norms in a given context. More specifically, un-
like other privacy frameworks, CI postulates that in-
formational privacy is not all about secrecy (blocking
information) [17] or control [18] but about the appropri-
ateness of information flow within a particular context.
Appropriateness of flow means flow that is compliant
with contextual norms governing informational flows.
We now describe CI in more detail.
CI model. The building blocks of CI are actors, at-
tributes and transmission principles. Actors are concrete
participants involved in an information exchange. An
actor can be a particular person or institution. As a
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Policy Contextual Integrity VACCINE DLP solution
Personal observations
(PO) made by the
faculty member (FM)
about a student may
not be disclosed with-
out the student’s con-
sent.
(FMsndr, Anyonercp,
Studentsubj, POattr, with per-
mission from the studentTP)
allowed(FERPACtx, FMsndr,
Anyonercp, Studentsubj, POattr)
explicit_permission(Studentsubj,
FMsndr, Anyonercp, POattr)
Conditions: a) PO in the con-
tent
b) sender is a Faculty Member
Action: a) stop the email b) dis-
play warning c) prompt permis-
sion to forward it to Student for
approval
Faculty members (FM)
do not have access
to student academic
records (AR) unless
they have a “legitimate
educational interest"
(lei).
(System, FMrcp, Studentsubj,
ERecattr, with legitimate educa-
tional interestTP)
allowed(FERPACtx, Systemsndr,
FMrcp, Studentsubj, ARattr)
lei(FMrcp, Studentsubj, ARattr)
Conditions: a) content includes
academic records
Exception: Sender is marked as
Faculty Member and has a role
which grants him lei access, e.g.,
as a advisor of the student
Action: Stop content from being
sent
Table 1. Examples on how policies are captured using CI and implemented using VACCINE in comparison to a generic rule-based DLP
solution. In the DLP solution column the rules comprise conditions, exceptions, actions, properties: [16]. Conditions: filter messages
that require attention. Conditions comprise predicated on senders, recipients, subject, body, headers and attachments. Exceptions filter
messages that are exempt from any conditional constrains. Actions specify what to do with the messages that matched by conditions
and are not exempt by exceptions, e.g., block the message, redirecting, editing original content and recipients set. Properties specify
parameters under which the rule is operational. e.g., on what date the rule is activated, mode of operation (test or live), and so forth.
Note, although we used the terminology from Microsoft Exchange in column 4, all larger DLP software provider offer similar semantics
to express DLP rules.
participant, actors can possess roles that describe the
capacity in which they function in a given context such
as doctors or teachers. An attribute is a piece of in-
formation being exchanged, such as a grade, a medi-
cal record, etc. Finally, a transmission principle reflects
the constraints associated with a given information ex-
change (e.g., under strict confidentiality).
Information flows. One appealing aspect of CI is that
it provides a simple and clear definition of information
flows. An information flow is a tuple
<sender, recipient, subject, attribute>
Sender, recipient, and subject are actors. A flow repre-
sents an atomic unit of an information exchange where
sender is sending attribute that refers to subject, to
recipient. From the CI point of view, communication
exchanges are simply sequences of flows defined in this
manner.
Contextual Informational Norms specify what flows are
allowed in a given privacy context constrained by trans-
mission principles. An informational norm can also be
described as a tuple:
<Sender, Recipient, Subject, Attribute,
transmission principle>
Here Sender, Recipient, and Subject refer to roles and
Attribute to a particular type of attributes. For in-
stance, in the educational setting, where information
exchange between actors is regulated by the FERPA
policies, students (the role of the sender and subject)
would be allowed to tell their parents (the role of the
recipient) about their grades (the type of the attribute).
The corresponding informational norm could specify the
transmission principle of reciprocity, as something that
is expected to happen. However, when a parent asks for
the school to provide the student’s record, i.e., originate
an information flow where the school, acts as a sender,
the parents are the recipients, the grades are attributes,
then this flow would be constrained by an information
norm with the transmission principle of permission be-
cause “[t]his information is protected under FERPA and
parents do not have access to it unless the student has
provided express, written authorization” [19].
Norm Violation
An informational norm is breached when an action or
practice disrupts the actors, attributes, or transmission
principles within a given information flow. For example,
a professor provides a TA with a student’s confidential
medical record. In other words, contextual integrity “is
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preserved when informational norms are respected and
violated when informational norms are breached” [12].
2.4 CI in VACCINE
We now describe how the VACCINE-based system op-
erationalize contextual integrity.
The actual implementation of contextual integrity
involves two steps. First, the information norms need
to be translated into operational privacy rules. Second,
there needs to be an engine for enforcing these rules.
A system that correctly implements contextual integrity
provides the following privacy guarantee: the system al-
lows exactly those flows that adhere to the given contex-
tual information norms.
As a possible implementation we chose to use Data-
log to formalize CI concepts as general Horn clauses and
a simple Effective Propositional Logic (EPR) for their
analysis. Our choice is largely motivated by the follow-
ing reasons: Datalog is a well-studied language and for-
malism that has found numerous applications, includ-
ing the analysis of social networks [20] and as a lan-
guage for expressing privacy and security policies (see,
e.g., [14, 21, 22]). We also found that Datalog and a
simple EPR analysis were sufficiently expressive for our
contexts of interest.
We would like to note that future implementa-
tions can opt not to use Datalog for their design of a
VACCINE-based system. In fact, we consider this as
one of the main advantages of the VACCINE design.
Information flow
The encoding of an information flow is simply a Datalog
tuple:
(sender, recipient, subject, attribute)
Sender, recipient, and subject are Datalog constants
used for representing actors and similarly for attribute.
Information leakage
The concept of norm violation in our work serves as the
definition of data leakage. In other words, preventing
data leakages amounts to preventing norm violations.
The CI norms describe the admissible system be-
haviors. As depicted in Figure 2, the CI norms are de-
rived from a combination of external sources such as
privacy handbooks and context specifications. Other ex-
ternal sources may also be used as a base for CI norms in
a specific domain, such as legal and policy documents,
professional codes of conduct, findings of empirical so-
cial scientists, privacy advocates, ethicists, stipulations
of sponsoring organizations, etc.
Each CI norm specifies a set of flows. We distin-
guish between actionable and non-actionable norms. Ac-
tionable norms specify the operational rules that define
the runtime behavior of the system. Conversely, non-
actionable norms define auxiliary high-level properties
that must be guaranteed by the actionable norms.
Actionable norms. An actionable norm explicitly
specifies whether a particular type of flow is admissi-
ble in the current system state. Such a norm can be ex-
pressed directly as a Datalog rule. Our Datalog encoding
uses predicates on entities that stand for contexts, ac-
tors, and attributes as described above. Central to the
encoding is the predicate:
allowed(Ctx, Sndr, Recp, Subj, Attr).
This predicate models that in context Ctx, actor Sndr
is allowed to send information on attribute Attr of ac-
tor Subj to actor Recp. For example, the following fact
states that in the classroom context (denoted class),
the flow where bob sends his own grade to alice is al-
lowed.
allowed(class, bob, alice, bob, grade).
In order to be able to express concisely the rules, we
further introduce a ternary predicate inrole(Context,
Actor, Role), which models that in the given context,
the given actor is in the specified role. For example, the
following fact states that in the classroom context, bob
is a student
inrole(class, bob, student).
The next rule then codifies the actionable norm that a
professor can let any student know her own grade:
allowed(class, Sndr, Recp, Subj, grade) :-
inrole(class, Sndr, professor),
inrole(class, Recp, student), Subj = Recp.
Transmission principle. In general, an actionable norm
may depend on the current state of the system. As men-
tioned in Section 2.3, such conditional dependencies of a
norm are captured by transmission principles. Here are
some examples of transmission principles in the educa-
tional context:
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fed into CI Flow Checker to check for violations with respect to existing privacy norms
Fig. 2. Privacy norms are sourced offline from a combination of privacy handbooks and context specification. The norms are manually
encoded into privacy logic to be verified for inconsistencies by the Privacy Logic Checker
– The receiver can access a student’s academic record
if he has a legitimate educational interest.
– A student’s private information can be accessed or
disclosed if the student gave written permission that
allows such actions.
– A student’s private information can be accessed or
disclosed to a parent of a student if a student is in
a life threatening situation.
Temporal constraints
We express actionable norms that involve temporal con-
straints in Datalog by introducing context-specific pred-
icates that capture relevant state (e.g., whether permis-
sion to access some information has been granted in the
past). Any such information on the history of the system
execution that is relevant for expressing an actionable
norm must be recorded explicitly in the system state.
For instance, we may have a ternary predicate lei that
encodes whether an actor has a legitimate educational
interest in accessing another actor’s attribute. The fol-
lowing Datalog fact then states that bob has legitimate
educational interest in alice’s grades:
lei(bob, grade, alice).
The lei predicate can be used to encode an actionable
norm that is conditioned on the transmission principle
of purpose as stated above. Note that the definition of
the predicate lei may change during execution of the
system. E.g., the fact lei(bob, grade, alice) may no
longer hold if bob leaves the university.
We also note that our EPR analysis does not reason
about the actual temporal constraints (i.e., properties of
sequences of information flows). We only reason about
properties of individual information flows.
Non-actionable norms. These are properties that
actionable rules need to satisfy. Some of the non-
actionable norms describe allowed flows of particular
importance. Other non-actionable norms describe im-
portant flows that should be blocked. More specifically,
the extracted non-actionable norms fall into the follow-
ing three categories:
Implicit Norms: These norms specify flows that are not
explicitly stated in the documentation but follow from
common sense and the underlying domain ontology. For
instance, in the FERPA context, a student should be
able to send herself a message containing her own per-
sonal data.
Completeness Norms: These norms also specify flows
that should be subsumed by the actionable norms. If
the extracted rules do not allow such flows, then there
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is a possible mismatch between the privacy expectations
of the privacy expert and the actionable norms. For in-
stance, one norm in the FERPA summary states that
a parent can access a student’s (private) non-directory
information in the case that a student is in an emer-
gency situation. At the same time, the norm does not
explicitly state that a parent can also access directory
information.
Blocking Norms: These norms specify flows that should
be blocked by all means.
3 Architecture
As depicted by Figure 1, systems relying on VACCINE
follow a client-server architecture:
Client The client side is designed to analyze commu-
nication exchanges in order to extract the relevant in-
formation flows, i.e., CI parameters. We envision two
main types of operational deployment setups: a) as a
standalone application b) as an addon to an existing
application such as email or a browser.
Server The server is located in the local (enterprise)
network and serves as a trusted entity to maintain the
privacy logic. Depending on the preferred setup, the
server can securely push the logic to the client side
which will perform the check on the extracted informa-
tion flows or let the client side send the extracted flows
for checking to the server.
The operational flow of VACCINE used to build
powerful DLP systems with the above described archi-
tecture comprises two main phases:
1) Offline As illustrated in Figure 2, a user of VAC-
CINE first extracts the privacy logic in the form of CI
norms from relevant external sources. Then, VACCINE
uses formal verification techniques to inform the user
in a feedback loop of any inconsistencies within the ex-
tracted norms. At the end of this process, the consistent
norms are automatically converted into actionable pri-
vacy rules.
2) Runtime As illustrated in Figure 1, during runtime
VACCINE mediates the flow of information between
participants to enforce the privacy rules that have been
extracted in the offline phase. Information exchanges are
processed by the CI Parameters Extractor provided by
the application to generate corresponding information
flows that are checked against the privacy rules by the
CI Flow Checker.
3.1 Extracting Privacy Logic
The process of extracting privacy logic consists of
extracting actionable and non-actionable norms from
a privacy handbook and checking their consistency.
By consistency, we mean that actionable and non-
actionable norms agree. For instance, no flows defined
by blocking norms should be allowed by actionable
norms.1
In practice, this involves the identification of the
required auxiliary state predicates and the actual speci-
fication of the actionable norms in Datalog as described
in the previous Section. The user may also identify non-
actionable norms that should be guaranteed by the sys-
tem but that may not be expressible in Datalog. VAC-
CINE supports the automated static verification of such
non-actionable norms as long as they remain expressible
within a decidable logic. This functionality is realized by
the Privacy Logic Checker.
We also point here to few other properties of
such privacy logic model. First, our model enjoys the
whitelisting feature: only flows defined by actionable
norms are allowed and nothing else, instead of explic-
itly denoting what flows are not allowed. Further, since
checking flow admissibility is done using a Datalog inter-
preter, as explained later in this section, the correctness
of well-studied Datalog semantics and the consistency
of the privacy rules make the resulting DLP system
correct-by-construction, subject to the extracted norms.
We now explain the technical details behind checking
the consistency of the extracted norms.
3.1.1 Privacy Logic Checker
The Privacy Logic Checker serves a tool to assist a DLP
team in verifying CI norms, improving their reliabil-
ity and overall understanding of a particular privacy
context. In VACCINE, this process amounts to check-
ing whether actionable and non-actionable norms are in
line, and is performed statically before the rules for the
actionable norms are in effect. In case this check fails,
i.e., there is an inconsistency between actionable norms
and non-actionable norms, the norms need to be cor-
rected. This process is repeated until there are no more
inconsistencies as depicted by the feedback loop in Fig-
ure 2.
1 We note that this notion of consistency should be not confused
with the notion of consistency in formal logic.
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Under the Hood of Privacy Logic Verification
The problem of verifying that a given set of action-
able norms R ensures a given non-actionable norm P
amounts to checking logical validity of the implication
R ⇒ P , or dually, that the conjunction R∧¬P is unsat-
isfiable. If the negation of P is expressible in Datalog,
the latter can be checked directly using Datalog queries.
However, in general, Datalog queries are not sufficiently
expressive to verify complex high-level properties. For-
tunately, we can embed Datalog in a more expressive
logic that is still amenable to automated reasoning and
yields tractable performance for the static verification
of high-level properties in practice.
Datalog is a fragment of first-order predicate logic.
Specifically, suppose we are given a set of rules R =
{R1, . . . , Rn} where each rule Ri is a Datalog clause of
the form
allowed(C ,Sn,R,Su,A) :- Ci,1, . . . , Ci,mi .
and the atoms Ci,j are either in_role and context-
specific predicates over the variables in the head of the
clause or equalities between these variables and con-
stants such as student, etc. Then the semantics of these
clauses is captured by the following quantified formula:
∀C ,Sn,R,Su,A.
allowed(C ,Sn,R,Su,A)⇔
(C1,1 ∧ · · · ∧ C1,m1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Cn,1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn,mn)
This formula falls into EPR, a decidable fragment of
first-order predicate logic [23]. Several automated the-
orem provers implement decision procedures for EPR,
e.g., the Satisfiability Modulo Theories solver Z3 [24]. If
the negation of the non-actionable norm P is also ex-
pressible in EPR, then we can use Z3 to automatically
check that the rules R guarantee P . Fortunately, many
properties of interest are indeed expressible in EPR. For
example, the following EPR formula expresses that in
the classroom context, a professor should not be allowed
to send a student’s grade to any other student, unless
that other student is a TA:
∀Sn,R,Su. in_role(class, Sn, professor) ∧
in_role(class, R, student) ∧
allowed(class,Sn, R,Su, grade)⇒
Su = R ∨ in_role(class, R, TA)
Note that this property cannot be checked with a sim-
ple Datalog query. We need the additional expressive-
ness provided by EPR. More generally, EPR can ex-
press properties about transitive information flows that
involve arbitrarily long sequences of information ex-
changes.
Our encoding into EPR of norms and properties
remains within a decidable logic that admits practi-
cal decision procedures. This means that we can ver-
ify these properties fully automatically using tools such
as Z3. In particular, a failed verification attempt is al-
ways due to an actual violation of a non-actionable norm
(as opposed to an incompleteness in the verification ap-
proach). If a particular non-actionable norm is violated,
the theorem prover will produce a model describing a
sequence of information flows that respects the rules but
violates the norm. Using this model, we can then iden-
tify the rules that are responsible for the violation.
3.2 CI Flow Checker
Checking whether a flow complies with the privacy logic
amounts to performing a single query of the allowed
predicate.
Going back to our educational privacy context of
classroom, denoted by class, suppose that our state of
the system includes the following facts:
inrole(class, bob, student).
inrole(class, alice, student).
inrole(class, steve, professor).
Then we can use the query mechanism provided by a
Datalog interpreter to check whether a specific infor-
mation flow satisfies all the extracted privacy rules. For
instance, given the above facts and the privacy rule de-
scribed in Sec. 2.4, the query
?- allowed(class, steve, bob, bob, grade).
evaluates to true, indicating that the corresponding in-
formation flow is admissible. The query
?- allowed(class, steve, alice, bob, grade).
evaluates to false, indicating that this flow is not per-
mitted. The semantics of Datalog guarantees that no
norm-violating flows will be permitted at runtime.
3.3 CI Flow Extraction
To identify the relevant CI parameters we reference the
domain ontology for existing actors and a range of pos-
sible attributes. This data needs to be provided to the
CI Parameters Extractor to identify the actors and at-
tributes within an information exchange and construct
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corresponding CI flows. The exact way in which flows
are extracted from an information exchange depends on
the actual exchange platform. However, we now sketch
common information exchange patterns and describe
their conversion to CI flows.
Explicit: This represents an information exchange be-
tween a sender and an explicit recipient, which for in-
stance, can be formed by an email, instant message,
SMS, etc. Each time a user explicitly states a recipient
of a message, e.g., in an email in TO/CC/BCC fields,
it constitutes a CI flows from the sender to explicitly
specified recipient. Explicit information exchange lends
itself well to CI flows, constrained by respective transi-
tion principles.
Implicit: Implicit information exchanges represent in-
teractions where the recipient was not explicitly spec-
ified. These interactions are formed as a byproduct of
the application logic. For example, when a user men-
tions someone in a tweet, all the followers of that post-
ing user will also see it as well, even without explicitly
being addressed as a recipient. Search functionality also
falls under this category because the posted informa-
tion reaches beyond the explicitly intended recipients.
Authentication and authorization mechanisms will typ-
ically comprise multiple interactions that stem from one
explicit information exchange, e.g., to login into a sys-
tem. An implicit information exchange yield an addi-
tional CI flow with same attributes and subject between
the new sender and the recipient. For example: suppose
Alice sent her grade to Bob in the first email. Bob wants
to forward that as an attachment in his email to Mary.
To check whether there is a violation, we need to check
two resulting CI flows, one with parameters of Bob email
to Mary and the (implicit) second with CI parameters
from the attached email, i.e., checking whether “Bob
can send Alice’s grade to Mary”.
Transitive: A transitive information exchange emerges
when a recipient forwards the information to a differ-
ent recipient, and so on. For example, when an email is
being forwarded, a tweet retweeted, etc. This is a great
example that shows how the CI theory differs from pre-
vious approaches. In theories that rely on private/public
dichotomy, a transitive information exchange can be
problematic in cases where private information is ex-
changed between A and B, then forwarded by B to C,
and there is a privacy rule saying that A cannot share
that information with C. However, with CI this is less
problematic because it looks at each flow separately and
only in the context of the CI parameters. For example,
let us assume a doctor shares with Jon his test results.
This is highly confidential information, which the doc-
tor cannot share without Jon’s explicit consent. So if the
doctor shares the information with Jon’s employee, this
will violate the privacy norm. However, nothing pre-
cludes Jon from sharing his personal medical records
with another actor. From the CI perspective, the re-
sulting transitive exchange from A to C is irrelevant as
such. Only the individual flows from A to B and B to C
are relevant for the privacy logic.
Importantly, each action defined by an application
logic typically comprises several of the above described
information exchange patterns, each possibly yielding
multiple CI flows.
Information exchange complexity. The complexity of in-
formation exchanges will often depend on a particular
application logic. Nevertheless, we give a general worst
case scenario analysis independent of any application.
Suppose we have a sequence of n related information ex-
changes, such as an email thread or subsequent retweets.
The complexity of an information exchange sequence
(CIES) is the sum of complexities of each constituting
information exchange (CIE). The complexity of a single
information exchange, CIEi in the sequence is defined
in terms of the CI parameters in the generated CI flows.
CIES =
n∑
i=1
CIEi =
n∑
i=1
Ri ×Ai × Si (1)
Here we denote by Ai , Ri , Si the number of attributes,
recipients, and subjects associated with flows generated
from the information exchange i. We measure the per-
formance of our systems under simulated information
exchange complexities in Section 4.3.
Proof-of-concept implementation
We have implemented a proof-of-concept DLP system
for educational setting using VACCINE. The client side
of the system is a Chrome browser add-on named Con-
textual Integrity-based Gmail App (CIGApp), whose
screenshot is shown in Figure 3. The CIGApp extension
assists users by retaining the integrity of the information
exchanges generated as a result of their emails by ensur-
ing that the subsequent email exchanges are consistent
with the FERPA context [19]. For our prototype, we
used the InboxSDK [25] library, which is widely used by
major companies such as Dropbox and Stripe, to take
control over the user’s Gmail inbox and extracts rele-
vant CI flows. We chose Gmail as our target application
layer since it is widely adopted by the majority of top
100 universities [26].
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Fig. 3. Screenshot from the proof-of-concept prototype with rele-
vant CI parameters identified
The DLP server is hosted on the Heroku cloud ser-
vice [27]. It hosts privacy rules encoded using Data-
log and SWI-Prolog execution engine that can interpret
Datalog (and Prolog) programs [28]. The interpreter is
used for checking compliance of flows against the rules.
The actual rules and their creation are explained in the
evaluation part of this section.
4 Evaluation
Our evaluation examines the applicability, feasibility,
and scalability of VACCINE DLP system in two pri-
vacy contexts: the educational context as captured by
the FERPA regulation [19], and an enterprise context
in the Enron corporation [29–31]. We primary chose the
educational context because it is the one with which
we are most familiar but also to illustrate that our
framework will allow building regulation driven DLP-
type systems which are currently missing in such (spe-
cialized) contexts. We note that VACCINE can also be
used with other contexts e.g., in enforcing the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
Privacy Rule [32]. Finally, in the absence of a real world
email dataset from an educational institute, we use an
Enron email corpus to simulate the volume exchanges in
a large enterprise to test the feasibility of our approach.
Our experiments focus on evaluating the core com-
ponents of the VACCINE framework. Specifically, we
aim to answer the following questions concerning the
DLP server side:
1. How formal methods can assist in the creation of a
consistent set of privacy rules?
2. What is the expected server load in terms of gener-
ated flows from information exchanges?
3. How efficiently can CI flows be checked against the
privacy rules?
4. What is the network performance of our prototype?
5. How effective is the VACCINE framework in pre-
venting potentially unauthorized flows in a real-
world emulated context?
4.1 Methodology
Our CI encoding of FERPA is based on a summary of
the FERPA law applied to a university context [33]. The
document summarizes how personal information related
to students (directory information, grades, etc.) can be
accessed and shared. In the document, we have identi-
fied 12 roles, 5 attributes, and 3 transmission principles
that define the space of potential CI flows in this con-
text. We chose the Enron corporation for our enterprise
context since both its code of ethics [29] as well as a
1.7GB big data set consisting of hundreds of thousands
of emails sent within the company are publicly avail-
able [30, 31]. From Enron’s code of ethics we extracted
CI parameters for an enterprise context. Our focus was
on CI flows related to the exchange of sensitive person-
ally identifiable information (PII) such as passwords,
bank account information, phone numbers, passwords,
etc. We identified 12 roles, 6 attributes, and 3 transmis-
sion principles that define the space of CI flows in this
context. In experiments that involve the creation of CI
flows from the Enron email data set, we have mapped
the names and email addresses of employees to their
roles in the Enron corporation by using the results of a
prior analysis of this data set [34].
Our evaluation primarily focuses on the server side
of our implementation as that is the product of using
VACCINE to create a prototype DLP system for edu-
cational settings. Unless otherwise noted, all of the ex-
periments were carried on a Intel(R) Xeon(R) machine
with eight 3.6GHz cores.
4.2 Experiences with Privacy Rules
Consistency Verification
In our first experiment, we checked if formal represen-
tation VACCINE uses for privacy norms is effective at
aiding the creation of a consistent privacy logic for a
given context. To this end, we extracted CI norms from
the privacy documentations for the FERPA and En-
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ron context (in practice this is done by a DLP team)
and checked their formal consistency using the theo-
rem prover Z3 (this process can also be automated),
as described in Sec. 3.1.1. In both cases, we extracted a
set of actionable norms that explicitly state which flows
are allowed in the context and non-actionable norms
that express consistency properties of the actionable
norms, as discussed in detail in Section 2.4. The ver-
ification ensures that the actionable norms enforce the
non-actionable norms. If the actionable norms disagree
with some non-actionable norms, we say that the norms
are inconsistent.
Results for FERPA We manually extracted privacy
norms from the FERPA summary by following the pro-
cess described in Figure 2. Eventually, we extracted 28
FERPA norms of which 18 are actionable (rules) and 10
non-actionable (Section 2.4). It took three iterations of
the check-refine loop in Figure 2 to obtain a consistent
set of actionable norms. The results of the experiment
are summarized in Table 2. We show the number of
norms for each non-actionable norm class, the average
time taken to check the consistency of these norms, and
the number of consistency checks that passed in each
iteration of the process. As can be seen, Z3 performed
the checking instantaneously.
In the first iteration of the norm creation process,
we extracted an initial set of 15 actionable norms and
checked whether they are consistent with the 3 implicit
norms, 3 completeness norms, and 4 blocking norms also
extracted from the FERPA summary. Checking each
of these non-actionable norms was done using a single
query to the theorem prover. As it turned out, none of
our implicit norms were consistent with the actionable
norms. Therefore, we added three additional actionable
norms that allowed the flows defined by our implicit
norms, resulting in a total of 18 rules.
In the second iteration, we rechecked the consis-
tency of the 18 rules subject to the completeness and
blocking norms. We first observed that one complete-
ness norm was still violated. This norm states that a
parent should be able to access student’s (private) di-
rectory information in the case of an emergency. Our
rules blocked such flows although we expected them to
be allowed: if parents are allowed to see student’s highly-
sensitive private information in the case of emergency,
then they should be able to also access less sensitive di-
rectory information. We then reached out to the authors
of the FERPA summary from which we extracted the
norms. According to the authors, they believe that par-
ents’ access to student’s directory information in emer-
checks consistent avg.
per iter. I II III time
Implicit 3 0 3 3 0.01s
Completeness 3 2 2 3 0.01s
Blocking 4 3 3 4 0.01s
Table 2. Results of checking inconsistencies between actionable
and non-actionable rules in iterations I-III
gency situations is implied, which was not clear from
the text in the handbook. We slightly modified one ac-
tionable norm to also account for this omission, i.e., to
allow parents to access student’s directory information
in the case of emergency. Also, our rules did not imply
one of the blocking norms, which states that parents
should not be able to access student’s private informa-
tion. The rules do block such flows except in certain
cases where parents have written access permission to
do so. We believe the authors of the summary document
also implicitly excluded these exceptional cases when
formulating the blocking norm. We therefore modified
the corresponding non-actionable norm accordingly. In
the final iteration of our check-refine loop, all the rules
were consistent with the non-actionable norms.
Results for Enron For this context, we created 43 En-
ron privacy rules that focus on access and disclosure of
PII in a corporate setting. The norm creation process
was informed by the available documentation of Enron’s
code of ethics and its organizational structure. However,
due to the lack of a publicly available (Enron) enterprise
privacy handbook that specifies precise norms, as in the
case of FERPA, we created norms to enforce a simu-
lated ethical wall on email communication between En-
ron employees. An ethical wall [35] refers to establishing
an environment that will prevent information exchange
between specific departments within the organization to
avoid any conflicts of interest.
Our rule creation process focused on each type of
PII and how agents in the various enterprise roles can
exchange the corresponding attributes. A typical exam-
ple of a rule is: Enron employees can send their social
security number (only) to administrative managers. We
did not have to create any implicit, completeness, or
blocking norms for this context. We immediately con-
verted implicit and completeness norms into actionable
rules. This is a by-product of our initial experience that
we gained from analyzing the FERPA norms and the
fact that we were given more freedom in creating ac-
tionable norms for the Enron context. The case of block-
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ing norms is more interesting. We created the rules by
following our white-list methodology that every flow is
disallowed by default unless there exists a rule that ex-
plicitly allows it. Initially, we had no rules, thus dis-
allowing any flow whatsoever. We subsequently added
the rules allowing more and more flows. Consequently,
we avoided the need for creating blocking norms in the
first place since they are implicitly guaranteed by our
approach. This experience enforced our belief that the
VACCINE privacy model could be the guiding principle
for writing privacy handbooks.
Summary We conclude that contextual integrity and
verification techniques allow one to detect flaws in the
privacy model and subsequently eliminate these flaws
by refining or adding new privacy norms.
4.3 DLP Flow Load
The goal of the next experiment was to assess the server
load that a DLP system created using VACCINE frame-
work could experience in practice. Specifically, we mea-
sured how many CI flows are typically generated in an
email conversation. For this purpose, we used the Enron
email data set [30, 31].
Setup We grouped the emails in the Enron data set
into conversations. We define an email conversation as
a set of emails with the same email subject (modulo re-
ply and forwarding prefixes, etc.). We extracted from
each email a set of quadruples (one per recipient) con-
sisting of the sender email address, a recipient email
address, the time the email was sent, and the recipient
type which can be TO, CC, and BCC, omitting the email
content and other metadata. Here is an example of such
a tuple:
(tracy.geaccone@enron.com,
sarah.taylor@enron.com, 2001-11-27 12:48:05,TO)
We identified every unique email address with a unique
participant. For emails sent to mailing lists, we simply
simulated broadcasting the email to all of the active
conversation participants.
Out of the whole Enron email data set, we randomly
chose 2,000 email conversations involving approximately
80,000 emails and 11,500 participants in total, as shown
in Table 3 (first and second row). We used the email
time and recipient type fields to recreate email threads
for each conversation. There are two email threads per
conversation on average, as shown in Table 3 (third
row). Due to some missing information in the data set,
Total Min Avg Max
Emails 78,386 1 39 15,555
Participants 11,609 1 17 2,428
Threads 4,082 1 2 196
Flows 218,070 1 109 85,280
Table 3. Statistics for each of the 2000 Enron email conversa-
tions
we observed cases where participants send emails in the
middle of the conversation although they never received
any emails in the conversation up to that point. In our
analysis, such emails start a new conversation thread,
which explains multiple threads per conversation.
We used the extracted email threads to generate CI
information flows for each conversation. As mentioned
in Section 3, a single email can generate multiple flows
between different participants. This is because an email
often quotes other emails that have been sent earlier
in the same conversation. In such cases, the new email
also generates transitive flows involving subjects and at-
tributes from the quoted emails to the new recipients.
To model the worst case scenario in terms of the infor-
mation flow complexity, whenever an email is sent by
some sender in a conversation, we assume the sender
creates new content and also transitively sends all of
the emails in the conversation up to that point. Also, a
CI flow has a subject and attribute. For the purposes
of this experiment, the actual subject and attribute val-
ues are not important. For transitive flows, however, the
subject is the sender of the corresponding email that is
being quoted.
Results Given the above dataset, we measure how
many flows an email yields in practice to asses the load
stress on the server. As it can be already inferred from
Table 3, a single email yields 2.78 flows on average.
Moreover, Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of
emails depending on the number of flows they generate.
It can be seen that the flow-per-email ratio is in general
low, reaching 15 at maximum. This suggests that the
load on a DLP server created using VACCINE will be
tolerable in practice. This is further evidenced by Fig-
ure 5 showing a linear increase in the number of gener-
ated flows subject to total number of thread emails.
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Fig. 4. Email frequency distribution based on the number of gen-
erated flows per email
Fig. 5. Average number of generated flows per size of the conver-
sation thread
4.4 Flow Checking Performance
The purpose of our next experiment was to measure
the general performance of checking flows against pri-
vacy rules. For that purpose, we reused the extracted
consistent Enron actionable norms that we created in
the experiment described in Sec. 4.2. We manually con-
verted these norms into Datalog (privacy) rules; this
process can also be automated. The rules together with
the Datalog engine constitute the Enron CI flow checker
(see Section 3). We chose the Enron context instead of
FERPA for this experiment as it aligns with the email
data set from which we extract CI flows.
Setup We created a state of the system by assigning
roles to Enron employees. For 138 Enron employees we
used their actual company roles taken from publicly
available data sources [36]. For the remaining employ-
ees whose actual roles are unknown, we assigned roles
randomly. We also initialized the system state using rea-
sonable assumptions about disclosure privileges for PII
information, namely that within each department (i.e.,
role) employees can disclose each other’s phone num-
bers and addresses. The transmission principles of cer-
tain norms depend on these disclosure privileges. The
resulting system state comprises about 7500 Datalog
facts, 2MB in total. This state of the system can be
thought of as a database that is queried by the server in
order to check flows against the privacy rules. We keep
the database in server memory for better performance.
Results We used the flows generated from the Enron
email data set to test the speed of checking flow admissi-
bility. More precisely, for each Enron flow we randomly
picked a sender or recipient as the subject of the flow.
We also randomly picked attributes. Datalog responsive-
ness Our first experiment set to test the responsiveness
of the Datalog interpreter itself. We automatically sub-
mitted the generated flows one after the other to the
interpreter and measured the response times. The re-
sults of the experiment are shown in Table 4 (first row).
As it can be seen from the average time of processing a
single query, Datalog flow admissibility checking is very
efficient. This is reflected in a good throughput.
Total
time
Time per
flow
Allowed
flows
Rejected
flows
non-mutable 206s 0.9ms 51,937 166,133
state updates 358s 1.6ms 51,911 166,159
rule updates 616s 2.8ms 51,898 166,172
Table 4. Results of checking 218,070 flows against the Enron
rules
In a typical system of an enterprise network, a
common information exchange will often also mutate
the state of the system. For instance, employees might
change their roles as they are being promoted in the
company. Hence, we also tested the responsiveness of
the flow checker in a setting where the state is updated
in between incoming flow admissibility queries. We ran
the exact same experiment, except that each query was
followed by a random state update request. The exper-
iment results are shown in Table 4 (second row).
Finally, we wanted to see how flow checking times
change if we dynamically add rules to the privacy logic
engine. In practice, rules might be added to the sys-
tem as the privacy norms evolve over time. Hence, we
repeated the previous experiment where in every 10th
update, we updated the database with a random rule
rather than with a random state change; hence, the sys-
tem had more than 20,000 rules at the end of the exper-
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Fig. 6. Connection and service times. Mean connection time is
1.34ms, service time 3.2ms, and mean request size is 158 bytes.
iment. Each randomly generated rule either (1) allows
flows with a random attribute where the sender, recip-
ient, and the subject need to satisfy some Enron tran-
sition principle or (2) allows a concrete random specific
flow. The results are shown in Table 4 (third row). Al-
though the average time to check a flow increases with
the increasing number of privacy rules, the server re-
sponsiveness is still very high. We note that the results
include the round trip time taken by a query to check
whether a given flow is allowed. Network deployment To
test the general VACCINE server responsiveness and
network performance, we used the free Heroku dyno
type service [37] which provides a server with 512MB
RAM, 1024MB swap, and 8 (virtual) CPU cores (In-
tel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2670 v2 @ 2.50GHz). Using
this setup, we reran the same experiment as above (with
no rule and state updates) but this time sent all the
flows in parallel instead of sequentially. This way we
tested the performance of the Datalog privacy engine
more thoroughly in a realistic setting. Figure 6 shows
that the connection time for each request averaged 3
milliseconds and the service time 2.07milliseconds. The
average size of a request was 158 bytes.
Our results indicate that a typical server will be
able to process requests efficiently without incurring a
significant overhead onto the network.
4.5 Data Leakage Prevention
In the final experiment, we analyzed how effective VAC-
CINE is at preventing the leakage of privacy sensitive
information in a realistic setting.
Setup We extracted CI flows from the Enron email
data set [30, 31]. As there are 138 Enron employees
with known company roles, we only considered email
exchanges between those employees as well as a sin-
gle generic third party agent that we associated with
all external email address. From each email, we extract
PII attributes using a simple keyword pattern match-
ing mechanism. Our flow extractor for this experiment
simply assumes that the sender is the subject of a flow,
except when the sender is the generic third party agent,
in which case the subject is the recipient. This exception
simulates the adversarial scenario where a third party
asks for, or generally refers to, sensitive personal infor-
mation of some Enron employee. We chose this simple
approach as more complete solutions require the use of
more advanced techniques, which is out of the scope
of this paper. In total, we extracted 592 flows for this
experiment.
Results 39 flows were rejected by the engine for the
extracted Enron rules. Interestingly, only password (37)
and bank account information (2) appear as attributes
in the rejected flows. In most instances, the rejected
flows with password as the attribute stem from emails
where an employee forwards another email of an exter-
nal website that asks for a password update, and when
employees send their password information to a third
party personal email address. We also observed the case
when one employee sent her own password for access-
ing Enron’s internal network to another coworker. The
two rejected flows involving the bank account attribute
are actually benign. In all such cases where a flow was
falsely rejected, the misclassification was caused by our
flow extractor rather than the flow checking engine.
role sender recipient
CEO 0 3
president 4 4
vice president 13 0
director 2 2
lawyer 0 1
trader 1 0
manager 9 0
employee 10 2
third party 0 27
Table 5. Breakdown of the number of rejected flows based on
sender and recipient role
For a more detailed analysis of the rejected flows,
we categorized them based on the role of the sender and
recipient. For each role, we show how much flows were
rejected when the sender (resp. recipient), was in that
role. The results are shown in Table 5. For instance,
there was not a single rejected flow where the CEO was
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a sender, but 3 flows were rejected when a CEO was
the recipient. As can be seen, the majority of the re-
jected flows have a third party agent as the recipient,
which is consistent with our manual inspection of the
corresponding emails.
The flows that the engine classified as admissible
mostly have bank account information (291) and pass-
words (164) as attributes. We manually inspected 200
of these flows to see if there are any potentially mali-
cious flows that were allowed by our rules. We found
one such case where a vice president was sharing con-
tact information about another higher rank employee to
employees of lower rank. Our rules prohibit such infor-
mation sharing; we allow contact information sharing
only with recipients who are further up in the company
hierarchy than the sender. The reason why this flow was
allowed is because our mechanism extracted the wrong
subject for this flow. The extracted flow itself was cor-
rectly classified. This problem could be rectified by us-
ing an advanced subject extraction mechanism. All the
other accepted flows that we inspected were extracted
correctly.
These experiments show that VACCINE provides
an effective tool for data leakage prevention, modulo an
effective flow extractor.
5 Related Work
The key building block of the VACCINE framework
is to define privacy and confidentiality specifications
of users and enterprises in the language of Contextual
Integrity (CI). We already discussed how VACCINE
compares to existing commercial DLP solutions in Sec-
tion 2. The research community has explored sophisti-
cated email DLP methods mostly relying on a combina-
tion of machine learning and related classification tech-
niques. These approaches roughly fall under content-
and behavior-driven methodologies [1].
Content-based approaches [9, 38–40] determine the
sensitivity of a message based on textual content analy-
sis, either through keyword, regex pattern matching, or
machine learning techniques.
Behavior-based approaches [41–43] analyze the or-
ganizational structure, common roles and duties, as well
as past interaction to identify “normal” behavior pat-
terns and use them to detect unlikely information flows
between a pair of sender and recipient.
Our work is largely orthogonal to these approaches.
While prior solutions explored advancing techniques in
identifying insensitive data and malicious behavior pat-
terns, VACCINE framework offers a robust way to ex-
press, verify and administer DLP policies.
Here we focus on related work in CI-based formal-
ization for building privacy-aware tools.
Defining privacy [12] in terms of CI is now a well-
established approach in the privacy and computer sci-
ence research communities. It is used to describe contex-
tual informational norms, to detect infractions of these
norms, and in approaches to accountability and enforce-
ment [13, 44]. Much of the prior work in this space has
focused on sophisticated formal logics for describing CI
norms that involve complex temporal properties of se-
quences of information flows such as those involved in
HIPAA [45–48]. However, these logics are typically too
expressive to serve as a suitable foundation for tools that
mechanize reasoning about privacy norms in real-world
systems. Our observation is that in the DLP setting,
the much simpler logical framework provided by Dat-
alog and EPR is sufficiently expressive to express the
relevant norms.
Other relevant works include [49] where the authors
proposed a prototype messaging system that checks
whether information exchanges comply with HIPAA in
a medical domain. The proposed approach uses pLogic,
a stratified version of Datalog, to formalize HIPAA reg-
ulations related to information sharing. This work is
similar to our approach, it is based on a different CI
model that introduces explicit additional parameters
such as purpose and believe which are not part of the
theory of CI and specific to HIPAA. Also, our work goes
beyond checking information flows against policies, as
VACCINE also ensures that the policies themselves are
logically consistent. In [44], the authors propose compu-
tational and information models of Implicit Contextual
Integrity in a social network. Our work complements
such efforts with a framework that provides stronger
guarantees in checking that information exchanges in
the system follow the norms and verifying them for any
inconsistencies with respect to privacy policies within a
particular domain.
6 Conclusions
We presented VACCINE, a framework for building DLP
systems. The key ingredients of VACCINE are the use
of the language of Contextual Integrity to define (en-
terprise) DLP privacy policies and their formalization
in verifiable logic. In our evaluation, we have demon-
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strated how an administrator can leverage the VAC-
CINE framework to derive a CI-based logic and then
use it to prevent unintended information leakage within
the organizational network, and beyond.
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